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 Underpricing of Venture-backed IPOs: a meta-analytic approach 
Listing firms are subject to underpricing because of asymmetry of information, but IPOs 
that are backed by a venture capitalist are subject to less underpricing. Although 
this condition is commonly verified by empirical evidence, there is a number of 
studies that find contrasting results. This paper aims to answer to the question: do 
venture capitalists effectively reduce underpricing at IPO? Evidence provides a 
negative answer, with venture-backed IPOs having higher underpricing, although 
with small effect. When performing meta-regression, results show that US 
studies, more recent samples and studies not controlling for age provide a higher 
estimation of the effect sizes. 
Keywords: venture capital, underpricing, IPO, meta-analysis, meta-regression 
JEL codes: G24, G10, G32 
Introduction 
Firms that go public are subject to underpricing, that is on average the IPO price is set 
below the price prevailing on the market right after the IPO. This phenomenon has 
found several explanations in the theory that all relate to asymmetries of information. 
Firms that go public are not known to the wide public of investors and their valuation is 
uncertain (firm characteristics and market conditions all influence underpricing). Setting 
a price lower than the "true" value of the firm encourages investors to subscribe the 
issue and compensate for the uncertainty and the opaqueness of the listing firm. 
Venture capital is often found to be able to reduce underpricing at IPO for 
companies listing on a given market. The empirical contributions on this issue are 
numerous and often provide contrasting evidence, which can be due to the fact that 
studies analyse different time periods and sample. It is not therefore fully clear if 
venture capital (VC) is actually able to limit underpricing at IPO as some studies find, 
or if this is not the case (as other studies find).  
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This paper aims to answer to the following research question: do VC backed 
IPOs have a lower underpricing compared to their non VC backed peers? 
To answer this question, we use a meta-analytic framework analysing the studies 
testing the relationship between the presence of VC at IPO and underpricing, measured 
on the first days of trading as the percentage change in price from the IPO price. To 
enable better comparability of studies, we focus on studies on European countries and 
on the US, published after 2001 and with a sample period after the year 2000, available 
on Scopus as at November 2015, that control for young and high-tech companies. 
To the best of knowledge, this is one of the first studies to use this framework to 
study specifically underpricing using recent data and focusing on European and US 
markets.  
Results show that on average the effect is in contrast with what predicted by the 
theories: in fact, we find a positive significant effect of VC on underpricing, but, at the 
same time the size is small. It seems hence that VC backing provides opposite results 
than what expected, but this evidence is in turn in line with previous meta-analysis 
provided on the performance of VC backed companies (with performance variously 
defined) (Daily et al., 2003; Rosenbusch, 2013). 
When performing meta-regression, we find that the sign of the relationship 
between VC backing and underpricing appears to be linked to the control for age and to 
the use of samples focused on the US. These two latter study specifications make the 
coefficient of VC effect on underpricing to be higher, together with more recent sample 
periods.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the main theories on 
underpricing and on VC contribution to performance at IPO. Section 2 presents the 
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methodology and the data collection. Section 3 presents the results and the last section 
concludes. 
 
1. Literature Review 
The empirical and theoretical literature has been working on the identification of the 
determinants of underpricing for decades. Underpricing is computed as the difference 
between the issue price (or IPO price) and the price prevailing at the end of the first 
trading day (Ibbotson, 1975; Ibboston and Ritter, 1995), that is generally positive, as on 
average the offering price is set below the price that prevails on the first trading day 
(Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). While it is sufficiently clear and established that 
underpricing exists and that it represents a “loss” for equity owners that list their 
company on a stock exchange (often named as “money left on the table” - Ritter, 1987) 
and that this phenomenon is mainly due to asymmetries of information, it is less 
established what are the driving forces determining the amount of underpricing (Daily 
et al., 2003; see also Kennedy et al., 2006 who test for competing theories explaining 
underpricing) and even if VC backed companies show a lower underpricing at all (da 
Silva Rosa et al., 2003; Brau et al., 2004). 
The main theories involving asymmetry of information can be summarised as 
follows. The first theory by Rock (1986) models a market with two types of investors, 
one group made of informed and one made of uninformed investors. According to the 
author, the uninformed investors would receive their full order only when the issue is 
overpriced as they are left with the stocks not subscribed by informed investors (the so-
called “winner’s curse”). To compensate for this mechanism, offering price may be set 
at a discounted price than what expected to induce uninformed investors to subscribe 
the issue. Several researchers have then extended Rock’s setting. Among them, Beatty 
and Ritter (1986) who include a cost to acquire information for the group of uninformed 
investors and Carter and Manaster (1990) who further develop on risky IPOs. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) discuss instead the “costly information hypothesis”. 
In this case, underpricing exists to enable investment banks to obtain private 
information by investors during the pre-selling period, when the offer price is set. 
Cascades also might be related to underpricing: when IPO occurs, some investors have 
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to be induced to buy to induce other investors to buy on their turn. To induce the first 
move, the issue has to be underpriced (Welch, 1992). 
Asymmetries of information also exist between issuer and investors. In this case, 
the issuer can send signals to the market to convey the expected value of the firm. 
Signalling theories also represent a key to understand underpricing (Bhattacharya, 1976; 
Ross, 1977). On this theory, much of the empirical literature using information from 
IPO prospectus is built (Daily et al., 2003).  
The presence of VC is generally believed to act as signal of the good quality of 
the firm and VC backing at IPO is able to limit underpricing (Gompers, 1996; Jain and 
Kini, 2000; Belghitar and Dixon, 2012) also because of VCs experience and superior 
information on the issuer (Barry et al., 1990; da Rin et al., 2013). The presence of 
venture capitalists enables to limit the asymmetries of information between investors 
and issuer. This is also because of screening activities performed by venture capitalists 
that yields them to invest only in the best companies, and monitoring activities that 
further improve target performance (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). This effect is 
stronger when venture capitalists retain a relevant portion of stocks after the IPO and 
continue monitoring the firm (Barry et al., 1990). Venture capitalists are also able to 
limit underpricing thanks to their relationships with investment banks (Chemmanur and 
Loutskina, 2006). 
At the same time, underpricing can be influenced by other factors that do not 
depend on VC intervention, such the hot or cold markets, the market characteristics 
(Ritter and Welch, 2002; Coackley et al., 2009; Bessler and Seim, 2012; Rosenbusch et 
al., 2013); and by several firm characteristics, such as firm age, size at IPO, (for a 
discussion on this issue, the reader might refer to Engelen and van Essen, 2010). 
With reference to meta-analysis, considering jointly underpricing at IPO and 
venture capital, two main contributions have been provided by the literature. The first is 
by Daily et al. (2003) and focuses on IPO underpricing. They investigate 74 paper 
published between 1986 and 2000 to test the determinants of performance at IPO; 
among these, the authors also include venture capital equity, claiming that the presence 
of this type of investor in the capital of the IPO company has a negative relationship 
with underpricing. Nevertheless, they find the opposite result when analysing the impact 
of VC on the return at IPO and hypothesise that a moderator effect exists and that the 
impact of VC can be correctly read only when analysed in conjunction with other 
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variables. Additionally, the authors claim that the cyclicality of capital markets may 
influence the impact of VC on underpricing. With specific reference to VC, again, the 
authors suggest that a non-linear relationship may hold, thus yielding counterintuitive 
results in the analyses that do not consider this issue.  
The second relevant meta-analysis is by Rosenbusch et al. (2013) who instead 
focus on venture capital and its impact on firm performance, where performance also 
includes performance at IPO (that is, underpricing). They analyse 48 studies published 
(or released) between 1991 and 2010. The authors, in general, find that VC contributes 
positively to performance (defined broadly as stock market, growth or profitability of 
companies) but when restricting the sample on the papers including industry effects, the 
contributions to performance becomes negligible from a statistical point of view.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data Selection 
We selected all the papers available on Scopus as at Nov 2015 and published after 
2001 that have the keyword “underpricing” in the abstract, title or keywords in all the 
scientific area. We obtained around 790 results. We then selected only the empirical 
papers that have the following characteristics: 
● aim: test the relationship between the presence of venture capital and 
underpricing at IPO, defined as the percentage change of the price on the first 
day of trading from the IPO price.   
● sample: European countries, or US. We excluded studies whose sample have 
IPOs from other countries, even if they include Europe or US countries, but we 
retained studies with just one or more European or US countries. 
● period: after 2000. If the sample period starts before the year 2000 and ends 
after, we included the paper if the median of the sample years in the period 
considered in the study is higher than 2000.  
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● type of offering: equity IPOs. We excluded SEO, REITS and mixed papers that 
do not control only for IPOs 
● type of company: studies that control for high-tech and young firms. 
We excluded paper not written in English. We end up with 22 papers and 25 
effect sizes.  
2.2 Methodology Used 
This study applies meta-analytical methods to quantitatively synthesize empirical 
evidence for the relationship between venture capital and underpricing. The main 
purpose of this meta-analysis is to make an appropriate aggregation of ‘effect sizes’ 
collected in a sample of studies. An example of effect size is the magnitude and sign of 
a correlation coefficient concerning a relationship of interest (Hunter & Schmidt, 2014). 
As noted by various scholars (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Geyskens et al., 2009), it has 
become increasingly popular in management and financial research to quantitatively 
integrate research findings across a large number of studies to examine whether there 
are prevailing relationships among a set of variables. 
In the present analysis we perform a meta-analysis and meta-regression on 
extracting regression slopes from the selected set of studies. In the meta-analytic 
literature sometimes, this is criticized because incomparability of different effect sizes 
(among others, due to different model formulations, different measurements) is 
allegedly supposed to exist across studies. The alternative to this is to select studies 
containing correlation coefficients only and synthesize them. However, the philosophy 
of meta-analysis is to extract as much information as possible from the selected studies. 
Moreover, evidence for relationships in economics and finance is much more 
retrievable from model coefficients rather than from simple correlation coefficients. 
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Finally, methods to transform regression slopes into partial correlation coefficients are 
widely used. In fact, problems and critics are much more focused on the side of 
performing meta-analyses of regression coefficients directly in the meta-analysis 
synthesis, that is using their values without any transformation to other effect sizes 
(Becker & Wu, 2007). For these reasons, we focus our attention on regression 
coefficients and their standard error, t-statistic or p-value. We then transform them into 
partial correlation coefficients as follows. Consider for simplicity (the extension to other 
types of models is straightforward) a multiple linear regression model of the form: 
 𝑌 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑋! +⋯𝛽!𝑋! + 𝜖   (eq. 1) 
and suppose that for a given study we have to convert the estimate 𝛽^! into the 
partial correlation coefficient for the variables 𝑋!, 𝑟!!!. Suppose that together with the 
value of this estimate we have also its standard error 𝑆𝐸!^!, or the correspondent t-
statistic 𝑡!^!, or, directly, the p-value 𝑝!^!. Suppose also that we have the overall 
degrees of freedom 𝑑 = 𝑛 − 𝑝 − 1 (𝑛 is the number of observations, 𝑝 the number of 
independent variables). Then the partial correlation coefficient is obtained as follows. 
● Partial correlation coefficient when coefficient estimates with their standard 
errors are extracted. In this case, we have: 
𝑟!!! = !^!!"!^! !!^!!"!^! !!!    (eq. 2). 
The sign of 𝑟!!!is the same of the regression coefficient. 
● Partial correlation coefficient when exact p-values are extracted (Thompson et 
al., 2011).  
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In this case, the normality assumption is assumed, and therefore the z-score 
corresponding to the p-value is computed. 
● Partial correlation coefficient when t-statistics are extracted. Similarly to (2) in 
this case we have: 
𝑟!!! = !!^! !!!^! !!!    (eq. 3). 
● Coefficient estimates with their significance levels.  
In this case, following Rindquist (2013), we set 𝑡!^! equal to the value of the t-
statistic corresponding to the significance threshold and given degrees of freedom. For 
example, if an original study reports 𝛽^! = 1.5 with 𝑛 = 54, 𝑝 = 3 and a (two-sided) 
significance level given by **𝑝 < 0.05, we get 𝑡 = 2.01, that is the 𝑡 value 
corresponding to 𝑝 = 0.05. Then we use formula (3) to get the partial correlation 
coefficient. If a parameter estimate is reported not significant (with no other information 
than its value), we simply set 𝑟!!! = 0. This assumption is quite restrictive and tends to 
over-represent 0-valued partial correlation coefficients in the overall results. 
The following pooling exercise to meta-analyse the partial correlation 
coefficients is performed through a random-effect analysis, according to the following 
steps. First, each 𝑟!!! is converted into a Fisher-transformed z-score: 
𝑧!!!! = !! 𝑙𝑛 !!!!!!!!!!!!     (eq. 4), 
which has an approximate normal distribution with standard error 𝑆𝐸 𝑧!!!! =
!!!!  (eq.  5). 
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Second, each computed 𝑧!!!!  is averaged across studies with weight 𝑤 equal to: 
𝑤 = !!" !!!!! !!^ (eq. 6) 
where 𝑣^ is the estimated random-effect variance (see Field, 2001 or Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985). 
The final average 𝑧!!!!  is obtained as a weighted average of the values of 𝑧!!!!  
computed for each estimate in the studies. 
After this pooling exercise, the Fisher transform average 𝑧!!!!  is back-
transformed to the average of the partial correlation coefficients by using the inverse of 
(4). 
As for the meta-regression analysis, we use a standard meta-regression model as 
follows (Stanley & Jarrell, 1989): 
𝑟!!!,! = 𝛽! + !!!! 𝛽!𝐷!" + 𝜀!   (eq. 7) 
where 𝑟!!!,! is the effects size in study 𝑖, (i = 1,…, n), 𝐷!" are K variables for 
study characteristics, and 𝜀! is an error term.   
3. Results 
3.1. Meta-analysis results 
 
Meta-analysis results show that, on average, the size of the coefficient associated with 
the presence of VC at IPO is 2.2 percent (Table 1). It seems hence that VC backed IPOs 
show a higher degree of underpricing if compared to other IPOs. This result seems to 
contrast with what predicted by the theory, as VC backed have worse performance. 
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Nevertheless, also Rosenbusch et al. (2013) in their investigation found a negative sign 
of the impact of VC on performance, broadly measured (in contrast with the theory that 
holds that VC selects better companies and are able to boost their performance in the 
long run).  
We report also the chi-squared test for heterogeneity, the 𝐼! statistic and the 
significance test for the effect size. The 𝐼! statistic is a percentage indicating the degree 
of the between-study heterogeneity (Higgins & Thompson, 2004; Harris et. al., 2008, p. 
8; ), and is calculated with the following formula, where 𝑄 is the Cochran’s 
heterogeneity statistic and 𝑑𝑓 is the degree of freedom: 
𝐼! = !!!"! ×100% (eq. 8) 
The value of 𝐼! lies between 0 percent and 100 percent, whereby negative values 
of 𝐼! are set to zero. This indicator is easily interpretable: the larger the value of 𝐼! the 
more heterogeneity can be observed. Although there is no absolute rule, a suggestive 
indication is that a low degree of heterogeneity is given when 𝐼! takes a value between 
25 percent and 50 percent, a moderate level is achieved when 𝐼! is between 50 percent 
and 75 percent and a high degree of heterogeneity is assumed when 𝐼! is higher than 75 
percent (Harris et. al., 2008, p. 18-19). Here we have a value (𝐼! = 76,6  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
between moderate and high. 
Figure 1 helps in clarifying the contribution of each study to the final result. The 
plot indicates whether the coefficient arising from each regression is positive or 
negative. The grey square indicates the size of the sample (also reported in number on 
the last right-hand side column), that is the representativeness of the sample included in 
the study, while the length of the horizontal line expresses the confidence interval (also 
reported in numbers on the next right-hand side column).  
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The diamond at the bottom of the figure represents the average overall 
coefficient, that is, the expected overall impact of VC on the underpricing of listing 
companies. 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
To highlight if the results are influenced by the presence of studies conducted in 
the US, we differentiate the meta-analysis depending on the presence or absence of US 
studies in the sample (table 2, figure 3). Results show that the expected sign is positive 
and significant for US studies, while it is negative, but not significant for studies 
focusing on other countries. Additionally, being US studies the ones which weight the 
most, it is clear that the final overall result presented above is influenced mostly by US 
evidence.  Similar conclusions can be drawn from the forest plot (figure 2), where the 
first block of studies is for non-US samples and the second for US ones.  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
 
As further clarification of the results of each empirical investigation, we also 
build the funnel plot that shows if there is publication bias. Funnel plots are used to 
show the bias that might arise when small sample studies with no significant effect 
remain unpublished, while this would be in fact a result and would be evidence that has 
to be taken into account when analysing the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variable. (Rosenthal, 1979; Iyengar & Greenhouse, 1988; Duval and 
Tweedie, 2000 for a discussion of funnel methods). Funnel plots are simple scatterplots 
of the effects sizes estimated from individual studies against a measure of study weight, 
which in general is the inverse of the standard error of the estimates. Therefore, points 
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representing studies with low weight should scatter widely at the bottom of the graph, 
whereas points representing studies with high weight should lie at the top of the graph 
and close to the pooled estimate. If the meta-analysis departs from this situation, then 
the presence of publication bias is suspected. We see from figure 3 that some studies 
suffer from publication bias, especially some of those considering US units only. Non-
US studies are shown as circles and US studies as triangles. As it can be observed, most 
studies outside the confidence limits in the upper bound are the US, while there are also 
3 non-US studies in the lower bound limit (which are Italian studies).  Nevertheless, it 
has to be noted that the bias might be due to other factors. We also tested for the so-
called small-study bias, that is the presence of systematic differences in the results of 
large and small studies caused by confounding factors such as differential study quality. 
The Egger’s test (Egger et al., 1997) for small study bias resulted not significant and 
therefore no small-study bias was present. 
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
 
3.2. Meta-regression results 
We perform meta-regression controlling for several study characteristics, described in 
table 3. The choice of variables is determined by the level of details provided in the 
study and by the use of a common set of variables. In fact, while it would be interesting 
to use a continuous variable to check for the effect of age, most of the studies do not 
provide a detailed description of the variable employed. This applies also to industry-
specific effects, as some studies indicate the model tests for industry fixed effect, 
without specifying how many industry dummies are introduced in the model.  
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Additionally, we first introduce a dummy for the studies using a binary variable 
to control for the presence of VC at IPO (UnS) that hence do not provide information on 
the relative weight or importance of the Venture Capitalist as stakeholder in the 
company, but check for its presence. Nevertheless, we then drop it, as most of the 
studies apply this methodology to control for venture capital presence, given the 
difficulty in retrieving this type of information. This amendment, moreover, enables to 
improve significantly the significance of the linear model.  
Finally, as JCR and SJR are highly correlated (86 percent), we use them one at a 
time. For the sake of synthesis, we present only results for SJR as this has a wider 
coverage of journals. Results do not change substantially. 
Results are summarised in table 4. Evidence shows a significant effect of studies 
controlling for age and for the sample geographical area. Studies controlling for age 
deliver a lower effect size in the relationship studied. The second significant variable 
(US) implies that studies using the US as sample area yield a greater effect size (the 
coefficient linked to VC impact on underpricing is positive and higher than for non-US 
samples). In specification 4, when dropping the length of the sample period and the SJR 
variable, also the median year of the sample period becomes significant. This suggests 
that sample periods including more recent years provide higher effect size (higher 
coefficient between VC and underpricing). 
Evidence provides hints for the evaluation of the effect of VC presence at IPO, 
suggesting that the ability of VC to limit underpricing does not emerge for US markets, 
where VC activity is more widespread and markets are probably more efficient when 
evaluating IPOs. Additionally, it would be interesting to evaluate if and how companies 
listing on US market are different (in size, industry, age) than the average company 
listing in Europe, where markets (with UK exception) are less mature. But, when 
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controlling for age, everything else equal, VC appears to be able to signal the better 
quality of companies, as the coefficient becomes negative and significant, suggesting 
that the size effect is lower in those studies. Finally, more recent IPOs have a lower size 
effect, as if the ability of VC to signal quality had changed over time (or characteristics 
of VC backed companies had changed over time).  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
4. Conclusions 
This study evaluates the contribution provided by the literature on the empirical 
evidence on the effect of the presence of a venture capitalist at IPO on the performance 
of the first trading day. The latter is commonly found to be high and positive, generating 
the so-called underpricing. VC backed companies are believed to be subject to less 
underpricing because of the signaling presence of the Venture capitalist. Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence is sometimes ambiguous. As it would probably be unfeasible to 
retrieve data for all the studies performed on this topic to control for the overall effect of 
VC at IPO, we investigate the effect of the presence of a VC at IPO on performance 
using a meta-analytic framework, focusing on companies listing in European countries 
or in the US since 2001 to find if the relationship arising from the studies is negative, as 
predicted by the theories, that is VC backing limits underpricing.  
To this end, we selected all the studies available on Scopus database focusing on 
the empirical relationship between VC and IPO underpricing, published after 2001 and 
using a sample period starting from 2001 (or whose median is greater or equal to 2001) 
focusing on European countries or US.  
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Results show that on average the effect is in contrast with what predicted by the 
theories: in fact, we find a positive significant effect of VC on underpricing, of around 2 
percent. The evidence is however consistent with previous results provided in the 
literature (Daily et al., 2003 and Rosenbush et al., 2013) that suggests a non-linear 
relationship might exist between the two variables or that other factors influence the 
size effect. This result is in part driven by the US studies that find a positive effect and 
that weight in the sample of studies considered because of the small standard error and 
wide sample used by the researchers.  
When proceeding with the meta-regression, we find again that US samples drive 
substantially the results towards a positive and higher underpricing for VC backed IPOs, 
together with the age of the listing firms and, in a final specification, the median year of 
the sample period. In a nutshell, what emerges is that studies on US IPO, with more 
recent sample years and not controlling for age yield (respectively) a higher estimate of 
the impact of the presence of VC at IPO on underpricing.  
Although presenting interesting innovative evidence on the latest studies on 
underpricing and VC contribution to listing firms, this study has some limitations. First 
of all, the research can be further extended by including more recent studies and by 
including other markets, although we believe it is necessary to differentiate between 
emerging and more mature markets. Additionally, also other sources of research papers, 
such as Google Scholar to cover journals not listed in Scopus, could be added. Finally, 
it could be interesting to evaluate how other firm and market characteristics influence 
the relationship between VC and underpricing, where available. 
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Tables  
Table 1: meta-analysis 
Study     ES 95 percent Confidence Interval percent Weight 
1 0.029 -0.082 0.140  1.12 
2 -0.053 -0.154 0.049 1.34 
3 -0.053 -0.172 0.066 0.98 
4 0.037 -0.057 0.131 1.55 
5 0.005 -0.062 0.071 3.09 
6 0.060 0.018 0.102 7.85 
7 0.095 0.048 0.142 6.28 
8 0.077 0.028 0.126 5.82 
9 0.063 -0.006 0.131 2.98 
10 -0.241 -0.380 -0.101 0.71 
11 0.143 0.067 0.219 2.38 
12 0.008 -0.091 0.107 1.42 
13 0.127 -0.049 0.303 0.45 
14 -0.145 -0.309 0.018 0.51 
15 0.114 -0.062 0.290 0.45 
16 -0.232 -0.395 -0.07 0.52 
17 0.018 -0.030 0.067 5.89 
18 0.025 -0.023 0.073 5.89 
19 -0.006 -0.037 0.026 13.56 
20 0.093 0.048 0.139 6.68 
21 0.012 -0.018 0.042 15.01 
22 -0.041 -0.157 0.075 1.03 
23 -0.223 -0.370 -0.076 0.64 
24 -0.223 -0.370 -0.076 0.64 
25 -0.016 -0.048 0.016 13.20 
I-V pooled ES    0.022 0.010 0.034 100.00 
Heterogeneity chi-squared = 102.53 (d.f. = 24) p = 0.000 
I-squared (variation in ES attributable to heterogeneity) =  76.6 percent 
Test of ES=0 : z=   3.70 p = 0.000 
  
Table 2: meta-analysis differentiating between US and non-US studies. 
Sample Number 
of studies 
Number of 
effect sizes 
     ES 95 percent Confidence 
Interval 
percent 
Weight 
       
US       
I-V pooled ES 12 13  0.044  0.029 0.059 63.61 
       
non-US 10 12     
I-V pooled ES   -0.016 -0.035 0.004 36.39 
       
Significance test(s) of ES=0 
US   z=  5.83      p = 0.000 
non-US   z=  1.56     p = 0.118 
Overall   z=  3.70      p = 0.000 
Only summary statistics per group of studies are reported. 
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Table 3: variables used in the meta-regression and brief description 
Variable name Description 
(UnS) 
Unknown Stake 
A dummy equal to 1 for those studies for which the stakes of VC is not 
known, i.e. for the studies that do not verify the countervalue or the weight 
of the VC presence in the capital of the VC-backed firm, that commonty use 
a binary variable to check for VC presence at IPO 
Industry A dummy equal to 1 if the study controls for industry effects 
Age A dummy equal to 1 if the study controls for the age of firms at IPO 
US A dummy equal to 1 for US samples 
Crisis A dummy identifying studies that include the years from 2007 onwards 
Length  Length of sample period, in years 
Median Median of sample period 
SJR Score obtained by the Scientific Journal Ranking – Scimago. If the journal is 
not available in the ranking, the value of the variable is 0 
JCR Score obtained by the Journal Citation Report – Web of Science. If the 
journal is not available in the ranking, the value of the variable is 0 
 
Table 4: meta-regression results using ??? as dependent variable and explanatory 
variables  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
sjr 0.002 0.001 0.001  
UnS -0.051    
Industry 0.025 0.032 0.028 0.026 
Age -0.133* -0.125* -0.122* -0.118* 
US 0.092* 0.084* 0.082* 0.084** 
Crisis 0.045 0.057 0.044 0.041 
Median -0.028 -0.030 -0.028 -0.029* 
Length 0.001 -0.001   
Constant 56.455 59.337 56.507 57.820* 
N 25 25 25 25 
R2 Adj -5.00% 2.78% 12.76% 21.42% 
F Stat 1.339 1.542 1.865 2.298 
legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
Appendix A 
Table a1: List of papers used for the meta-analysis with main characteristics on sample 
and period of study. 
N Authors Year Sample area Sample 
period 
Sample 
period 
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begins ends 
1 Bruton & al.  2009 UK 2000 2003 
2 Chahine et al. 2009 UK 2000 2003 
3 Chemmanur et al. 2010 US 1999 2004 
4 Hanley 2010 US 1996 2005 
5 Chahine & Filatotchev 2011 UK 1999 2003 
6 Chahine & Goergen  2011 US 1997 2004 
7 Ferretti & Meles 2011 Italy 1998 2008 
8 Hao 2011 US 1996 2005 
9 Capizzi et al. 2011 Italy 1998 2008 
10 Hanley & Hoberg 2012 US 1996 2005 
11 Johnson & Sohl 2012 US 2001 2007 
12 Mogilevsky & Murgulov  2012 US 2000 2009 
13 Song 2012 US 2000 2011 
14 Wang & Wan 2013 US 2000 2007 
15 Pennacchio 2013 Italy 1999 2012 
16 Hoque 2014 UK 1999 2006 
17 Akyol et al.  2014 Europe 1998 2012 
18 Pennacchio 2014 Italy 1999 2012 
19 Migliorati & Vismara 2014 France, Germany, Italy, 
UK 
1995 2010 
20 Benson et al. 2015 US 1995 2011 
21 Bradley et al. 2015 US 1994 2011 
22 Park et al. 2015 US 1998 2007 
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Figure 1: forest plot of the studies that show the coefficient for the VC effect on 
underpricning and the confidence level of the coefficient. 
 
Figure 2: forest plot differentiating between non-US (upper part) and US (lower part) 
studies that show the coefficient for the VC effect on underpricning and the confidence 
level of the coefficient. 
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Figure 3: funnel plot with US studies (red triangles) and non-US studies (blue dots) that 
investigates the presence of small sample study bias. 
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